Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

5-1-1986

Agency Costs and the Agricultural Firm
James Roumasset
Marilou Uy

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Roumasset, James and Uy, Marilou, "Agency Costs and the Agricultural Firm" (1986). Discussion Papers.
509.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/509

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

I

ECONOMIC GRCWI'H CENI'ER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER ID. 501

AGENCY CX)STS AND THE AGRICUL'IURAL FIRM

James Roumasset
Yale University
Marilou Uy
The World Barik

May 1985

Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to
stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications
to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the authors to protect the
tentative character of these papers.

Agency Costs and 'l1le Agricultural Finn

The form of institutions used to organize resources for production and
distribution is an area which has received increased attention from econanists
in the last decade.

Two theories have evolved which share the comparative

institutions perspective first discussed by Coase (1937, 1960), the principal
agency theory (a nathenatical formulation of contractual choice) and the
positive agency theory (a non-mathematical explanation of patterns of industrial
organization).

The theory of organizational form in agriculture has generally

centered arourrl tenure choice in which different tenancy arrangements are viewed
as types of emplo~nt contracts.
In this paper, an alternative model developed by Eswaran and Kotwal
(1985) in vmich share tenancy is seen as a partnership between a landowner and a
tenant is elucidated.

Tenure choice is also investigated as part of a general

study of the nature and causes of the agricultural firm.

In order to do this,

agricultural firms are first classified according to the degree of
specialization. When this is done, a mnnber of apparently diverse observations
about tenure choice seen to fit a more general pattern; the higher the land
productivity, the higher the degree of specialization.

A principal-agency

framework is used to construct a theory of the relationship between the degree
of sep:tration between labor and management and land quality, and data from a
sample of Philippine sugarcane farms are used to verify this hypothesis.

AGENCY COSTS AND THE AGRICULTURAL FIRM
- James Roumasset and Marilou Uy*

In the last decade, there has been a major rekindling of interest
among economists in the form of institutions used to organize resources
for production and distribution.

Jensen (1983) distinguishes two "agency

literatures" that share the comparative institutions perspective
introduced by Coase (1937, 1960).

Principal agency theory (e.g.

Stiglitz, 1975; Harris and Raviv, 1978; Shavell, 1979; Holmstiom, 1979;
Lewis,1980) provides a mathematical formulation of contractual choice and
has been primarily directed to the trade-off between risk-sharing and
incentives against labor shirking.

Positive agency theory (pioneered by

Coase, 1937; resurrected by Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; and currently
represented e.g. by Fama and Jensen, 1983) is non-mathematical and places
relatively more emphasis on explaining actual patterns that characterize
industrial organization.
In agriculture, the theory of organizational form has centered
largely around tenure choice.

The theory of tenure choice has an

illustrious history in the economics literature (e.g., Smith, 1922;
Marshall, 1920; Heady, 1947; Day, 1967; Cheung, 1969; Rao, 1971;
Stiglitz, 1974; Reid, 1976; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979; Binswanger and
Rosenzweig, 1982).

In recent years, alternative tenancy arrangements

* The authors are Visiting Fellow, Yale Economic Growth Center, and Young
Professional, The World Bank, respectively. We wish to thank Armen
Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Theodore Groves, Sumner La Croix, Shankar
Sharma, and Brian Wright for formative discussions and useful comments
on previous drafts.
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are commonly viewed as types of employment contracts (e.g. Newbery and
Stiglitz, 1979; Braverman and Stiglitz, 1975; Harris and Raviv, 1978;
Shavell, 1979; Holmstr~m, 1979; Lewis, 1980).

In an innovative departure

from the view of tenancy as an employment contract, Eswaran and Kotwal
(1985) have modelled share tenancy as a partnership between a landowner
who specializes in decision-making and a tenant who specializes in labor
supervision.

More generally, questions of tenure choice, employment

contracts, management systems, and farm size can all be usefully viewed
as aspects of the agricultural organization.

The purpose of the present

paper is to elucidate this view and to investigate tenure choice as a
part of the general study of the nature and causes of the agricultural
firm.
The paper is organized to highlight the inductive approach
employed.

Section 2 classifies agricultural firms according to the

degree of specialization and who gets the residual payment.

The

classification is combined with previously documented patterns of tenure
choice in order to posit a preliminary hypothesis about the relationship
between the economic environment and the nature of the agricultural
firm.

Section 3 uses a principal-agency framework to construct a theory

of the hypothesized relationship between the degree of separation between
labor and management and land quality.

Section 4 provides an

illustrative statistical verification of the hypothesis based on a sample
of Philippine sugarcane forms.

Section 5 summarizes the paper and

discusses two implications of the transaction cost approach for
institutional design.
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2.

Classification of the agricultural firm
(a)

Classification

The literature on optimal tenure choice deals mainly with three
types of contracts--share tenancy, lease and wage arrangements.

Often,

these contracts are considered as alternative payment mechanisms for
labor (Stiglitz, 1975; Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979).

Rigid

classification of agricultural contracts into three types of labor
arrangements may be misleading, however.

Various forms of share-tenancy,

lease and wage systems as well as combinations thereof pervade
agriculture.

Such diversity may be better dealt with by viewing tenure

forms not as mere labor payment mechanisms but as organizations or
agricutural firms.
In the spirit of Frank Knight and Ronald Coase (1937), the firm can
be viewed as an alternative to market organization.

Both Knight and

Coase stressed the role of the entrepreneur as a coordinator of
resources.

Knight portrayed the firm as an entrepreneur with an

authority relationship over the other factors.

Cease extended this view

by stressing the cost of using the market, i.e., of contracting the other
factors from outside the firm.

In the words of Douglas North (1981),

''according to Coase, the ~dvanta;e of the firm over
transacting in the market 1s a gain as a result of a
reduction in transactions costs . . . (presumably at
least partly in consequence of the authority).''
Several authors have elaborated on this theme, focusing on the
nature and sources of the transaction costs of using the market.

Barzel

(1982) stresses the measurement costs involved in monitoring contract

performance.

Williamson (1975) and Klein, Crawford,and Alchian (1979)
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discuss the role of opportunism in increasing the costs of contract
enforcement.

Arrow.(1974) discusses conditions under which abandoning

the invisible hand of the market in favor of the visible fist of
authority may reduce the costs of communicating decisions and
coordinating production.
These observations help explain the existence of firms.

They also

contain the rudiments of a theory of the boundaries of the firm, i.e., of
what will be purchased from the market and what activities will be
coordinated with the firm.

What is inside and what is outside the firm

depends on the relative advantages of the specialization afforded by
markets vs. the reduction in transaction costs facilitated by
relationships among the firm's principals.

These relationships are

governed both by bonding or "F-connections" (cf. Yoram Ben Porath, 1980)
and by an explicit or implicit agreement among principals that can be
characterized as a contract prescribing rights and duties of the parties,
decision-making mechanisms, and rewards and/or sanctions for good and bad
citizenship.

This "constitution" and the institutions for prescribing

and enforcing future activities constitute the governance structure of
the organization (Williamson, e.g. 1985).

1

In agricultural organization, share contracts can be classified
according to whether they are essentially labor contracts or
relationships among firm principals.

There are two distinct types of

1 See also Goldberg (1979) for a discussion of "relational exchange".

I
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share contracts in agriculture.

One is primarily a labor contract such

as the gama or ceblokan arrangements in Asian rice production whereby the
worker receives a small share of the output for harvesting and other

specified tasks.

1

The other is more of a partnership wherein the

tenant receives a larger share, typically 1/3 to 2/3, for assuming the
responsibili ty for most of the work (including supervision) and
day-to-day decision-mak ing (e.g. about the composition and timing of
inputs).

Most of the principal-age ncy literature, by modelling share

tenancy as an employment contract, fails to make this distinction.
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) model share tenancy as a partnership, but,
unlike previous partnership interpretatio ns (Reid, 1976,
1978; Hallagan, 1978; and Murrel, 1981), they abstract from
In what follows, we reserve the term

decision-mak ing by the tenant.

"share-tenan cy" for medium or long term relationships where the tenant is
a principal in the agricultural firm and participates in decision-mak ing,
Short-term hiring arrangements wherein

as well as worker supervision.

workers are paid a percentage of the gross are viewed as a special case
of piece rate labor contracts.

2

1 Gama or Ilani, as practiced in the Philippines, is an arrangement
whereby the worker contracts to weed and harvest a specified
parcel for typically 1/6 of the rice harvested for that parcel;
ceblokan practiced in Indonesia, typically requries transplantin g,
in addition to harvesting and weeding, for the same 1/6 share
(Roumasset, 1978; Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981). Remarkably, a similar
arrangement was documented in the The Constitution of Athens
almost 3,000 years ago. Workers contracted under a sharing
arrangement in ancient Greece were called Hectomori or "sixth
partners".
2 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantage s of piece
rates vs. wage contracts, see Stiglitz (1978) and Roumasset and Uy
(1980).
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Both Coase and Knight identified the firm with the set of resources
organized by a single entrepreneur.

But since both the landlord and

tenant are principals in the typical share tenancy arrangement in Asia,
we require a broader definition to facilitate analysis of agricultural
organization.

Accordingly, we regard the firm as an organization

oriented towards production and under the control of its principals.
Entrepreneurship may be shared among multiple agents with diverse
interests.
In their "Separation of Ownership and Control", Fama and Jensen
(1983) propose "a spectrum of organizations" distinguished by the degree
of separation of management and risk-bearing functions.

They emphasize

that separation of management (the initiation and implementation of
decisions) does not imply a loss of control (the ratification and
monitoring functions).

Reminiscent of Cease, Fama and Jensen note that

the benefit of "separate" management is the greater degree of
specialization that it affords.

While such specialization comes at

greater agency costs, these costs are mitigated by the control mechanisms
retained by the principals.
In agriculture, separation of the management and labor functions is
a more useful characteristic for distinguishing common types of
agricultural firms.

Figure 1 illustrates a spectrum of agricultural

firms with specialization and separation of work, management, and control
increasing from left to right. The most unspecialized firm is the owner
operated firm with no hired labor.

We call this the owner-worker firm

since labor comes from the owner's household.

The middle of the spectrum

represents various forms of tenancy with the tenant's responsibility for

7

management increasing from left-to-right.

The two forms at the far right

correspond to the Fama and Jensen distinction regarding separation of
ownership and control.

Both arrangements are owner controlled and rely

primarily on hired workers for labor but in the most specialized case,
some of the management, for worker supervision and day-to-day operational
decisions, is also hired.

owner
worker

I

I

share pure share
lease
worker manager tenant
Figure 1:

I

share
worker

I

.1 d
hire
owner
lease
manager manager manager

A spectrum of agricultural firms

As the degree of specialization between labor and management
increases from left to right in figure 1, management is increasingly
compensated by receiving a share of the residual and labor increasingly
so.

Thus in the owner-worker firm, the farm family provides the labor

and is paid a 100% share of the returns net of operating costs.

The

owner-manager hires the labor and receives the returns net of operating
and labor costs as a return to his land and managerial inputs.

1

Similarly, the lease-worker receives the residual as payment for
his work and the lease-manager receives the residual, net of the wage
bill, as compensation for management.

For example, leasehold

1 Clearly, intermediate cases can be observed. Theoretically, these
could be ranked by specialization in management according to the value
added by management related to the value added by hired labor. Since
this statistic is usually not readily available, proxies may be needed
for empirical analysis.
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contracts held by relatively high income whites in the post-bellum
American South compensated the leasehold primarily for management and
capital inputs.

Lease contracts held by blacks and poor whites, however,

were essentially incentive arrangements for labor.

Poor leaseholders

tended to follow established cultivation practices and obtain credit from
merchants (see e.g. Reid, 1979).
Figure 1 also illustrates different forms of share tenancy
according to the degree of separation between labor and management and
the share of output going to the land and the landowner's contribution to
management.

The share-manager is defined as a share tenant who provides

all of the non-land inputs.

A share-worker provides only labor and

perhaps some minimal equipment.

The landowner makes the productive

decisions and provides most of the variable non-labor inputs.

A piece

share tenant provides most of the labor, shares the cost of other
variable inputs with the landowner, and typically makes most of the
production decisions.

The landowner's share also increases as one moves

from left to right on the spectrum.

Thus the share-worker, commonly

known as a "sharecropper" in literature on the post-bellum American
South, is somewhere between a wage worker and a share tenant.

The

share-manager is somewhere between a share tenant and lease-worker.

1

In summary, the tenure choice literature has traditionally focused
on the employment contract between the landowner and the worker, who may

1 Several authors have regarded the constancy of tenant shares, typically
said to equal 50%, as one of the stylized facts of share tenancy
(Newberg & Stiglitz, 1979; Bell & Zusman, 1976; Hurwicz & Shapiro,
1978; Allen, 1985; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985). These authors have failed
to recognize the great variations in tenancy shares across space, time,
and crop (Cheung, 1969; Roumasset, 1981; Datta, et. al., 1984; Bardhan,
1984).
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be paid a wage, a share or the residual profits after deducting a fixed
rent.

We propose a-broader view in which agricultural firms are

distinguished according to the extent to which management and labor are
provided by separate economic agents an the extent to which the landowner
receives the residual payment.

In this view, the residual payment is, at

least in part, the rent paid to organization-specific assets.

1

Thus a

tenant's receipt of part or all of the residual is compensation not only
for his labor, but also for his equity in the land,

2

his draft animals

and farm equipment, and his farm specific managerial skills.
b)

Patterns, Synthesis, and a Preliminary Hypothesis

Despite the large literature on tenancy, few stylized facts about
tenure choice on different environments have emerged which a theory
should be expected to explain.

In this section we attempt to combine

apparently diverse observations about the incidence and forms of share
tenancy across land types of varying productivity to suggest a possible
relationship between the extent of specialization in the agricultural
firm and the value added by land and management.

We do this neither to

place inordinate emphasis on land quality nor on technological
determinism but to illustrate how describing and explaining general
relationships between contracts and the environment may help to elucidate
the determinant of economic organization.

1 Organization-specific assets include fixed plant and equipment,
institutionalized procedures, skills and other assets that have lower
value to other organizations (Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p. 31)
2 In the Philippines, for example, tenants can sell cultivation rights
for as much as 50 percent of the market value of the land (Hayami and
Kikuchi, 1981).
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We begin with the observation that the incidence of share tenancy
relative to the owner-worker increases with land productivity.

In the

Bicol region of the Philippines~ the two predominant types of
agricultural firms at the beginning of the Green Revoluiton (i.e. up to
at least 1970) were share tenancy and owner-operated family farms with
little or no hired labor.

The Bicol region is comprised of three

"rice-bowl" provinces containing the Bicol River Basin, two island
provinces with severe weather problems, poor soil quality and high
transportation costs, and one "intermediate" province contiguous with the
rice bowl but with uneven topography and a relatively high proportion of
upland rice.

Statistics on tenure form show a strikingly higher

incidence of share tenancy in the more productive areas.

In the

rice-bowl provinces, 56% of the sample farms were operated by share
tenants vs. 22% owner-operated family farms.

In the intermediate

province, there were 24% share tenants and 25% owner operators, and in
the Island provinces there were less than 5% share tenants and 72%
owner-operated family farms.

1

On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that the incidence
of share tenancy decreases with land quality relative to the owner
managed firm, which relies on hired labor.

For example, Datta et. al.

found, in a large sample of farms in India, that the incidence of wage

1 These statistics were computed from the 1970 Bureau of Agricultural
Economics Integrated Agricultural Survey of 1013 Bicol farms as
reported in Roumasset (1976). Only 13 sample farms were operated on
leasehold arrangements. Most of the remaining sample farms were
operated by part-owners.
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contracts relative to share contracts, increased with irrigation.

This

suggests the importance of distinguishing different types of owner
operator, lease, and share arrangements.

Since owner-operated firms can

be more or less specialized than tenanted farms, depending on the degree
of separation between management and labor, the search for general
patterns regarding the relative incidence of share tenanted and owner
operated farms may be a futile one.
In an extensive analysis of Indian data, Bardhan (1984) also finds
that the incidence of share tenancy increases with land quality factors
such as irrigation and rainfall relative to owner-operated family farms.
His statistics also suggest a rough correlation between the ratio of
share tenancy to lease-worker tenancy and indicators of land
productivity, with share tenancy dominating in the eastern and
northwestern parts of India and fixed-rent tenancy predominant in the
southern states.

While evidence is consistent with the land

productivity-specialization hypothesis, this should not be taken as
verification in lieu of better proxies for land qualty and an indicator
of specialization within forms of fixed-lease tenancy.
More direct evidence on the land quality-specialization hypothesis
is available on the different forms of share tenancy.

Several previous

studies have shown that locational differences appear to affect both the
terms and the form of share-tenancy arrangements.

Roumasset (1976) found

that a sample of rice farms in Laguna, Philippines, with high rents per
hectare and favorable soil conditions, were typically operated under a
"supportive" contract ("pure share tenant" in figure 1) where the
landlords received SO percent of the gross harvest and paid SO percent of
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the cost of seeds and fertilizer.

For the sample farms in Albay

province, where soil and weather conditions are worse, share-lease or
"nonsupportive" contracts were used under which landowners received only
1/3 of the harvest but did not share in the costs.

1

These findings

were later generalized for both rice and non-rice tenants.

Both output

and input shares of landowners were found to be positively correlated
with land quality in the Philippines, Java (Indonesia), and Bangladesh
(Roumasset and James, 1979; Roumasset, 1981; Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981;
Ali, 1979).

Bardhan (1984) also found a strong association between the

incidence of cost sharing by the landowner and the landowner's share and
between landowner's share and land quality.
Both the landlord and the tenant do more management in pure share
tenancy (supportive) arrangements.

At least in the Philippine case,

there also appeared to be substantially more hired labor under pure share
tenancyJ with the tenant providing supervision, input decisions, and
day-to-day management.

In summary, relatively unspecialized

share-operator arrangements tend to be more common on poorer quality
land; on better land the share tenant specializes more on management and
cost sharing is used to help induce efficient input use.
Thus a number of disparate observations about the incidence and
forms of share tenancy are suggestive of a general pattern between land
productivity and specialization in agricultural organization.

In the

1 In share-worker arrangements, such as the sharecropper in the
post-bellum American South, landowners commonly received more than
SO% but also provided the inputs and made most of the production
decisions. These arrangements are relatively rare in Asian
agriculture.
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next sections we explore a possible theoretical explanation for this
relationship and then illustrate a more direct method of verification.
3.

Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Development of the Hypothesis
a)

A principal-agency approach to positive agency theory

In this section, we attempt to model efficient contract choice in
the presence of information and enforcement costs about input use.

Most

of the principal-agency literature in economics has focused on labor
shirking.

But investments in land improvements may also be "shirked" by

"mining" the land or, more generally, by failing to maintain the optimal
level of fertility and productive capacity.

Managerial inputs, both for

decision-making and supervision, may also be shirked.
The model that follows uses the principal agency framework to make
explicit just what is being optimized but borrows from positive agency
theory the notion that more than one input is susceptible to shirking.
This allows the optimal organizational form to vary according to the
environment without requiring large differences in risk-bearing
abilities.

The model also incorporates an important disadvantage of

fixed lease contracts that helps to explain the unpopularity of such
contracts in many environments.
We first extend the principal-agency model (see e.g. Stiglitz,
1974; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979; and Lewis, 1980) to allow for two
sources of shirking.

Represent the value of output as a function of both

labor, x, and land maintenance/improvement, z.

For simplicity assume two

periods such that the present value of output can be expressed as:
D = D1(X1, -&1) + D2(X2,

Z,

-e-2,

r)
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where D1 and Dz are the discounted value of output functions for
periods 1 and 2, 01 .and Oz are the two stochastic variables and r is
the real discount rate.

Investment in land, z, is made in the first

period and increases output in the second period.

Positive investments

such as improving or maintaining the irrigation ditches increase z.
Negative investments, e.g. allowing noxious weeds to propagate or
intensive cultivation practices that "mine" the soil fertility, decrease
z.

In order to clarify the meaning of efficient contract choice, we

abstract from "managerial shirking" in the mathematical version of the
model.
The agent (e.g. tenant) chooses the level of investment in land and
The

labor in the two periods so as to maximize the expected utility, u.

principal (landowner) chooses a payment schedule, Pi, which relates the
agent's income to D and the principal's (imperfect) monitoring of the
inputs.

The agent's income can thus be expressed as P = Pi(D, X1, Xz, Z)

where the principal chooses i from the set of possible contracts, C, and
the principal's income as v = D-P-m, where mis monitoring costs.

The

principal's profit maximization problem is
Max vi = D - p - m
ieC,m

(1)

subject to U > U
where U =

Max

U

(P,

X1,

Xz,

z)

and where mis monitoring expenditures by the principal and U is the
utility level available to the agent in his best alternative.
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The principal agency formulat'ion provides a convenient measure of
the efficiency of contracts.

Define maximum unconstrained 1 expected

profits as:
(2)

where

xt:

1,

x~•:2, and z~-: are optimum inputs under the assumption of

costless measurement and enforcement of input levels.
The inefficiency or agency cost of the ith contract can be
expressed as:

where Vi is the solution of (1) for a given i.

Since rf* is a

constant, finding the highest V; yields the same contract as solving
for the lowest Aj, i.e.,
l i l V=V1 } = {jl A*=Aj}

where V=max V;
i-eC

and

(4)

A*=min Aj .
j.eC

Equations 1-4 provide a sense in which the assumption of positive
agency theory, that contracts evolve so as to minimize agency costs, is
equivalent to the assumption of principal agency theory, that equilibrium
contracts maximize the constrained objective function of the

1 The terms "constrained" and "unconstrained" are used here, in the
sense of constrained pareto optimality (e.g. Newbery and Stiglitz,
1981), to distinguish models that incorporate transaction costs
from models that abstract from transaction costs. Unconstrained
profits are also equivalent to "first-best" profits and
constrained profits are equivalent to "second-best" profits in the
sense of Lewis (1980).
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principal.

1

The framework also provides a clarification of the meaning

of agency costs, defined by Fama and Jensen (1984) as:
"Agency costs include the costs of structuring,
monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents
with conflicting interests, plus a residual loss incurred
because the cost of full enforcement of contracts
exceeeds the benefits."
In the principal-agency framework, the costs of structuring,
monitoring and bonding are represented by mi*, and the residual

constrained profits to the principal, before accounting form;*.
The proposition that "efficient" contracts minimize agency
costs" obscures a 3-level heirarchy of optimization problems.

Since

"minimize" refers to the choice across contracts, "agency costs"
must be interpreted to mean the least cost combination of
measurement and enforcement activities associated with a particular
contract, i.e. ,

Moreover, the optimal mis chosen subject to

optimal shirking by the agent.

These levels of optimization are

transparent in the graphical exposition of agency theory employed
below (figure 2).
b)

A Theory of Specialization and Tenure Choice

We can now use the agency cost framework to explain the
apparent association between land productivity and the degree of
specialization in the agricultural firm.

In particular, we wish to

illustrate why a landowner might employ a tenant on a fixed lease

1 To maintain this correspondence where the principal is not risk
neutral, then V must be defined to be net of a risk premium.
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basis to provide the labor and supervision for land of low
productivity but would be more likely to hire wage workers if there
were substantial pot~ntial benefits from investing in land
maintenanceand improvements.

Following Eswaran and Kotwal, since we

wish to develop alternative explanations for agricultural contracts
to the conventional moral hazard ~heory, we abstract from differences
in ability to bear risk between landlord and worker.
The advantage of fixed-rent tenancy is well-known.

V

By paying

labor the residual, incentives for labor shirking are eliminated. An
important disadvantage of fixed-rent tenancy, aside from possible
risk-bearing problems, is the possibility of "mining the land"
(Marshall) or what we term as "land shirking".

If the fixed lease

contract is only for one-period or if enforcement costs make
collection of period-2 rent difficult, the tenant may choose to
deplete the productivity of the farm in period 1 and abandon the
That is, if farming techniques are available that

farm in period 2.

sufficiently enhance first period output at the expense of
maintaining the productive value of the land, then the utility
maximizing strategy may be to maximize his income in the first
period, break (or not renew) his lease and rejoin the labor force in
the second period.

1

This model clearly has relevance beyond two

1 We assume that there is sufficient labor mobility that period 1
performance will not markedly affect the wage received in period
2. Alternatively, the second period wage penalty for poor
performance in period one may be incorporated into the enforcement
technology for the lease contract.
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periods. So long as the landowner's rights to collect future rents are
attenuated (e.g. by.flight of the tenant or the threat of land reform
laws by the state), then the tendency to stint land improvement inputs
will discourage landowners from renting their land out on a fixed fee
basis.

Moreover, since the prospects of technological change and other

forces outside the control of thecontracting parties render the
competitive rental value of land uncertain in the future, fixed-rent
contracts will tend to be of limited duration.
The cost of land shirking will depend primarily on the marginal
efficiency of investment in land maintenance and land improvement.

Land

with low natural productivity and artificial improvements tends to be
less vulnerable to depreciation than land with high natural productivity
(e.g. fertility and low pest population) and improvements (e.g. land
levelling, terracing, irrigation).

While land shirking may be a minimal

problem in some environments, in others it may be the predominant
determinant of agricultural organization.

In contrast, labor shirking is

less environmentally determined and more related to the amount of
monitoring.

It is therefore plausible that in environments with little

predisposition for land shirking, contracts will be chosen to mitigate
labor shirking and thereby save on costly monitoring.

Where land

shirking is potentially a major problem, however, contracts may be chosen
for their incentive for investment.

In these cases, direct monitoring of

labor can be used to manage labor shirking.
The theory of environmentally determined contractual choice
sketched above is presented in terms of agency costs in figure 1.

In

each of the four quadrants, agency costs are the sum of shirking costs
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(SC) and monitoring costs (MC).

Each graph corresponds to a particular

contract in a particular environment.

The two graphs on the top

represent "invulnerable" land and the bottom two represent vulnerable
land.

The graphs on the left correspond to rent contracts; those on the

right, to wage contracts.

Following the assumptions proposed in the

previous paragraph, shirking costs under wage contracts are shown as
being relatively responsive to monitoring and relatively unresponsive to
environment.
Relative contractual efficiency can be seen by comparing the point
of minimum agency cost (MAC) for the two contracts under each
environment.

The assumptions implicit in the shapes of the shirking

curves imply that the relative efficency of wage contracts increases with
the vulnerability to land shirking.

Figure 1 illustrates the case

wherein one type of land is sufficiently invulnerable to shirking such
that rent contracts dominate and another type sufficiently vulnerable
that wage contracts dominate.

The graphs thus illustrate how different

contracts may be preferred in different environments.
Factors other than the marginal efficiency of investment may also
influence vulnerability.

Greater attenuation of property rights and more

uncertainty about equilibrium rents in future periods render the
landowner vulnerable to losses in the value of land relative to the
first-best optimum.
the share of

Another determinant of agricultural organization is

value added attributable to land (including capital

improvements), labor, and management.

Where management contributes a

substantial proportion to value added, organizational forms that reward
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specialized management will tend to be favored.

We hypothesize that

management is relatively more important on better quality land.

This

provides a complementary explanation of the association between the
degree of specialization and land productivity.
4.

Statistical Verification:

An Illustration

As we observed in Section 2, most existing data is not suitable to
provide direct verification ,of the specialization and quality
hypothesis.

This section reports on a sample of Philippine sugarcane

farms wherein the different forms of owner-operated farms are
distinguished and ranked according to the degree of specialization.
Philippine sugarcane farms show a large diversity in contractual
forms--from the subsistence owner-operated to owner-controlled farms with
hired labor and management.

The sample of sixty sugarcane farms

described below exhibits a wide range of contractual forms, facilitating
a more complete illustration of how contracts respond to locational
factors that affect the vulnerability of land and management to shirking.
Owner-managed farms seem to have better land, large farm sizes, and
more intensive application of cash inputs such as fertilizer and
chemicals than share-tenants.
also done by tractors.

A larger portion of their cultivation is

Owner operated farms or subsistence farms tend to

have poor land and less intensive application of fertilizers than share
tenants.

A ranking of contracts based on the extent of application of

inputs shows a positive relationship between factor intensity and extent
of specialization.
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The more specialized forms of organization tend to predominate in
the highly productive "sugarbowl" province.

In the Laguna and Tarlac

areas, which are less suitable for sugarcane production, share-tenancy
and owner-operated farms are more common.

Several leased farms were

observed but they were characterized by hired agri~ultural workers and a
lessee-manager.

Since the contracts are classified here on the basis of

specialization of management, these leased farms were ranked as a more
specialized contractual form, the lease-manager.
The task of econometrically documenting the relationship between
contractual choice and environmental characteristics is rather awkward.
Both the environment and the contractual arrangement are multiattributed
entities and most of the attributes defy accurate measurement.

It is

presumably these difficulties that largely account for the tendency to
ignore the role of environment in contractual choice.
For purposes ·of illustration we focus on the degree of separation
between labor and management as the primary characteristic of tenure
choice.

However, what we observe is not the degree of separation but the
Accordingly, we rank tenure choice according

category of tenure choice.

to the degree of specialization as shown in table 1.
manage and cultivate their own farms
specialization.

1

,

Owner operators

and have the least

Share tenanted farms are largely managed and partly

cultivated by the tenants.

2

Harvesting the cane of share tenanted

1 Specialization within the family is not considered here. The
family is considered as one unit, rather than as a group of factor
owners.
2 Since all share tenants in the sample receive 50 percent of the
output we do not distinguish here between share tenants and share
managers.
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Table 1:

Tenure
Status

A~erage farm 5ize, average yield per hectare,
and average inputs per hectare by tenure status.

Specialization
rank

# of
obs.

Average
Average
Average
yield/ha. farm
fertilizer
(piculs/ha.) size
expense/ha.
(ha.)
(pesos/ha.)
C

R

C

R

Average
Chemical
expense/ha.
(pesos. ha. )
C

R

Owner-operator

5

9

Share-tenancy

4

26

89

82

2.9

553

448

Lease-managed

3

3

85

112

16.0

710

470

23.3

0

Owner-managed

2

7

97

88

12.1

605

729

15.1

15.1

Owner-controlled 1
(hired manager)

15

113

97

148.0

1075

1003

152.2

154.7

*

--

C is cane crop, while R is ratoon crop.

Source: Uy (1979)

farms is done primarily by hired labor.

In the owner-managed farms in

the sample, all labor is hired, i.e .. provided by separate agents thereby
involving a greater degree of specializatio n than the share tenanted and
leased-manage d farms.

On sugar plantations, even the plantation manager

and the supervisory personnel are hired.
One important characterist ic of the farming environment is the
vulnerability of the farms to what we have called land shirking.

The

more vulnerable lands are those with potential for fertility reduction
and those that continually practice control of potentially destructive
weeds, insects and diseases in order to keep the pest population low.

1

l'
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Farms that continually cope with high pest populations (e.g., because of
high populations on-nearby farms) and have inherently low fertility are
less vulnerable to land shirking.

High productivity farms are more prone

to land shirking than low productivity lands that are incapable of
generating large rents.

Accordingly, a land quality index, measured as

expected revenue per hectare minus production costs, is used as a proxy
for vulnerability to land shirking.

1

For simplicity, we have assumed a linear relationship between
tenure choice and land quality.

OLS regression will not provide either

unbiased or efficient estimates of their relationship.

The error terms

of the linear model do not conform to Gauss-Markov assumptions; moreover,
the OLS estimates of the ordinal dependent variable may fall outside the
specified range.

The alternative estimation procedure used here is the

ordinal probit model developed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975; see also
Madalla, 1983, p. 46-49).
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation show a positive
relationship between tenure choice and land quality.

The land quality

coefficient yielded at-ratio of 2.45, which is significant at the 1
percent level (using a z-test).

The conventional F-test to test the

significance of the multiple correlation is not appropriate with the
ordinal probit model.

Significance of regression equation can be tested

by computing minus twice the log likelihood ratio, in this case 6.10.

1 See Roumasset and James (1979) for a discussion of the
relationship between land quality and rent. Not only are rents
higher on high quality land but, under profit maximization, the
output elasticity of land is also higher, implying a higher
landlord's share on tenant farms.

I
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This statistic is distributed as chi-square and is significant at the 5%
level.

Despite the.rough nature of our proxy and the use of only one

independent variable, the results are consistent with our hypothesis that
the type of land has a significant influence on tenure choice.

Where

land quality is low and land shirking relatively unimportant, there is a
tendency to give the residual payment to labor and thereby control labor
shirking.

Where land shirking is relatively important, labor shirking

tends to be controlled directly by supervision; landowners retain most of
the residual, thus providing incentive for land maintenance.
The empirical results do not prove that land productivity is
irlJ'bldinately influential in shaping agricultural organization.

The

results do help to illustrate, through the example of land quality, how
physical and economic factors that influence production technique may
also shape the mode of production.

Since production technique and tenure

choice are determined simultaneously, this view clarifies the futility of
attributing productivity differences to tenure choice.

It also

highlights the possible danger of government efforts to "reform"
agricultural institutions and to force farmers to conform to the "best"
tenure arrangements.

On the other hand, where government attempts to

design better institutions are inevitable, e.g., for some aspects of
public land management, then the efficiency view may help planners to
learn from the rich variety of indigenous institutions.
5.

Summary and Conclusions
Tenure arrangements are usually modelled as alternative modes of

employment.

We suggest an alternative view of agricultural organization
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here in which agricultural firms are classified according to the degree
of separation between labor, land and management.

While the conceptual

framework used descends from positive agency theory (e.g., Jensen and
Meckling; Fama and Jensen, 1983), we have shown how a principle agency
framework can be used to clarify the meaning of "minimum agency cost".
Classifying agricultural firms by separation between labor and
management requires distinguishing different forms of owner operated,
share, and lease arrangements.

In the unspecialized owner operated firm,

the labor is provided by the farm owner's household.
managed farm, most of the labor is hired.

In the owner

There are two main types of

share tenancy, one with cost sharing and one without, where cost-sharing
arrangements are combined with higher landowner shares.

Employment

contracts, where workers receive a small share of the output in return
for performing particular tasks, e.g., harvesting and weeding, are
essentially piece rate arrangements for hiring labor and do not
constitute share tenancy firms.
Once firms are arrayed according to the degree of separation or
specialization, a number of apparently diverse observations about tenure
choice seem to fit a more general pattern--the higher the land
productivity, the higher the degree of specialization.

A method was

developed for obtaining a more direct verification of this pattern and
illustrated using a sample of sugarcane farms in the Philippines.
Two determinants of specialization were identified which are likely
to be related to land quality--vulnerability to land shirking and the
importance of management.

Where land shirking is a potential problem and
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the scope for management errors large, then the firm's incentives are
more likely to be oriented towards efficient management, with labor
shirking controlled by direct monitoring.

Where production and asset

management is less important, then organizations geared to minimizing
labor shirking are more likely to be chosen.
Land quality is one of presumably several determinants of tenure
choice.

Other economic and environmental determiants need to be

identified and measured.

The productivity-specialization hypothesis

illustrates how patterns in contractual choices may be documented,
verified and how to operationalize comparative institutional analysis.
The efficiency model helps to explain the diversity of
organizational forms found in different agricultural environments.

This

provides an operational alternative to the view that some institutions
are inherently more efficient than others and that certain sylized facts
about agricultural organization stand as prima facie evidence of the
inefficiency of agriculture in developing countries.

1

To the extent

that the agency cost approach 2 helps to infer lessons from indigenous
institutions, these lessons can be applied in the design of new
institutions in both the public and private sectors.

1 For example, several authors have cited the inverse relationship
between farm size and yield per hectare as evidence of dualism in
the agricultural sector and have concluded that Robin Hood land
reform would increase agricultural production.
2 The agency or transaction cost approach is an integral part of the
New Institutional Economics (Williamson, 1975;, 1985; Roumasset,
1978).
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